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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-How Best To Protect State
Sovereignty - Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
INTRODUCTION
When federal government involvement touches areas arguably
reserved to the states, the issue of dual sovereignty is immediate-
ly raised. The term "dual sovereignty" in this Note means that
the authority to govern is vested in two distinct governing
authorities -the federal government and the states. Constitution-
al law has long recognized that the national government is one
of limited enumerated powers; it can exercise only the powers
expressly granted it.' In addition, the Court has indicated that,
absent an express constitutional violation, it will not limit an
enumerated constitutional power. With respect to the commerce
power, the notion of state immunity from federal regulation cre-
ates a paradox. The paradox arises from the Court's inability to
define the commerce power in a way that limits its scope. It is
when the Court develops artificial tests for defining the scope of
the enumerated powers that it begins down a slippery slope of
constitutional analysis.
While the notion of dual sovereignty fell into constitutional dis-
favor during the forty-year period from 1936 to 1976, the doc-
trine was revived to a limited extent in National League of Cities
v. Usery (NLC.' In NLC the Court held that state regulatory im-
munity exists when Congress seeks to exercise its power to regu-
late commerce so as to force directly upon the states its choices
"as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral
governmental functions are to be made."' The 1974 amendments
to the Fair Labor Standards Act were beyond the commerce power
of Congress to the extent they sought to displace the states' abili-
ty to regulate areas of traditional governmental functions.'
However, NLC failed to identify how to distinguish between a
traditional and nontraditional governmental function. Thus, as was
the case with other artificially created judicial attempts to protect
state sovereignty, NLC was overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority.' In Garcia the Court applied a
modern commerce clause analysis6 and recognized that the tenth
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
3. Id. at 855.
4. Id. at 852.
5. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
6. See infra notes 38, 39 and accompanying text.
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amendment is not an independent limitation on the commerce pow-
er of Congress. By so holding, the Court identified a means of
reconciling the paradox. State sovereignty is best protected by
the internal workings of the national political process rather than
through the exercise of judicial review.'
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the short-lived revival
of the doctrine of dual sovereignty while also looking at the ori-
gin of the doctrine and judicial attempts historically employed to
protect state sovereignty. Particular emphasis will be placed on
the significance of the Court's holding that the national political
process is the best protector of federalism, and the extent to which
Garcia can be extended into other areas of constitutional analy-
sis. Furthermore, the Note will address how Garcia can be recon-
ciled with Justice Black's view that "Our Federalism" means that
"the National Government will fare best if the states and their in-
stitutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways. "'
FACTS
Until the United States Supreme Court decided NLC, the San
Antonio Transit System complied with the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) overtime requirements. However, four months after
NLC, the San Antonio Transit System informed its employees that
under the NLC decision it was no longer subject to the FLSA over-
time requirements In 1978, San Antonio transferred its facili-
ties and equipment to the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority (SAMTA), a county-wide public mass-transit authority.
One year later, the Wage and Hour Administration of the
Department of Labor issued an opinion that SAMTA was not im-
mune from the FLSA overtime requirements under the NLC de-
cision.'0 Then, on November 21, 1979, SAMTA filed suit against
the Secretary of Labor seeking a declaratory judgment that NLC
precluded the application of the FLSA overtime requirements to
SAMTA." Seeking enforcement of the overtime requirements,
7. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
8. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Justice Black further explained his meaning:
The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" [sic] any more than it means centraliza-
tion of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers
rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity
to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Govern-
ment, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Id.
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the Secretary of Labor counterclaimed. " Garcia brought suit
against SAMTA that same day, seeking overtime pay under the
FLSA." However, that action was stayed pending the outcome
of the initial suit."' In December of 1981, the Department of Labor
amended its interpretive regulations to provide that NLC did not
entitle public mass transit companies to immunity.15
Ruling that public mass transit constitutes integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions, the district court,
on November 17, 1981, granted SAMTA's motion for summary
judgment and denied the Secretary's and Garcia's cross motion
for partial summary judgment. 6 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252,
both Garcia and the Secretary took direct appeals to the Supreme
Court. " Following the decision in United Transportation Union
v. Long Island Railroad,8 the Court vacated the district court's
judgment and remanded the case for consideration in the light of
Long Island Railroad. On remand, the district court adhered to
its original findings and entered judgment for SAMTA. 9 Again
the Secretary and Garcia took direct appeals. Noting probable
jurisdiction, the Court heard initial arguments and then returned
the cases to the calendar for reargument in order to determine
whether NLC should be reconsidered."0
Reversing the judgment of the district court, the Court over-
ruled NLC and held that the "traditional governmental functions"
test" ' was unworkable and inconsistent with established princi-
ples of federalism." More important, the Court also held that
"[s]tate sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal sys-
tem than by judicially created limitations on federal power.""
HISTORICAL NOTION OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY
The notion of dual sovereignty comes from the tenth amend-
ment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-




15. 44 Fed. Reg. 75, 630 (1979), codified as 29 CFR § 775.3(b)(3) (1983).
16. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 535.
17. Id.
18. 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (holding that state-owned rail service is not a traditional governmental function
and hence does not enjoy constitutional immunity under NLC from the Railway Labor Act).
19. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donavan, 557 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
20. 468 U.S. 1213 (1984).
21. See generally infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
22. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
23. Id. at 552.
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States respectively, or to the people." ' However, two differing
views counter each other. First is the view that the tenth amend-
ment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered,"25 Opposed to this position is Justice Marshall's view
that "[iut cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution
is intended to be without effect." 6 Justice Marshall later clarified
his position when he stated that the 10th amendment. . . leav[es]
the question, whether the particular power which may become
the subject of contest has been delegated to the one government,
or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair construction of the
whole instrument."
27
In McCulloch v. Maryland,8 Chief Justice John Marshall wrote
for the majority and upheld the right of the national government
to establish the second Bank of the United States. By so doing,
Marshall defined implied federal power very broadly. Under the
necessary and proper clause, the power to establish the bank was
implied in order to effectuate an enumerated power. From McCul-
loch comes one of the most often quoted passages in constitutional
analysis. The test to determine the extent to which federal power
can reach was stated as follows:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist [sic] with the letter and spirit
of the constitution, are constitutional.'
However, despite defining implied federal powers very broad-
ly, Marshall also recognized an area of state control. "In Ameri-
ca, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the government
of the Union, and those of the States. They are each sovereign,
with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign
with respect to the objects committed to the other."' While McCul-
loch does not suggest that there are independent limitations on
enumerated powers, it does recognize state sovereignty, and there-
fore, serves as a starting point for the notion of dual sovereignty.
Both the issue of state sovereignty and the paradox created by
dual sovereignty were identified in Gibbons v. Ogden." Although
24. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
25. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803); accord Wright v. United States, 302 U.S.
583, 588 (1938); see also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428-29 (1956) ("As no constitutional guarantee
enjoys preference, so none should suffer subordination or deletion .... To view a particular provision of
the Bill of Rights with disfavor inevitably results in a constricted application of it. This is to disrespect the
Constitution."). See generally Castro, The Doctrinal Development of the Tenth Amendment, 57 W.VA.L.Q.
227, 228-29 (1949).
27. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406.
28. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
29. Id. at 421.
30. Id. at 410.
31. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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the Court held that the power to regulate interstate commerce is
exclusively vested in Congress, Justice Marshall also held that
"[t]he completely internal commerce of a state . . . [is] reserved
for the state itself."" Despite this statement, it does not appear
that Marshall made it with the intention of attempting to protect
state sovereignty. Indeed, Marshall identified the paradox. "This
[commerce] power, like all others vested in Congress, is com-
plete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and ac-
knowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution."" Then Marshall seemingly rejected the notion of
dual sovereignty:
If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is
plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States,
is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the
same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States."
In an extreme departure from the teachings of Gibbons, the
Court during the early 1900's limited the scope of the commerce
power whenever a seemingly legitimate state interest was in-
volved.3" This practice was accomplished by developing judicial
limitations under the guise of state sovereignty and was preva-
lent in legislation that affected conditions of manufacturing and
employment.
The 1895 case of United States v. E. C. Knight Co. " is respon-
sible for the heightened judicial recognition of dual sovereignty.
There the Court held that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not ap-
ply to a company that had acquired a monopoly on the manufac-
ture of refined sugar in the United States. The essence of the
opinion is that the manufacturing process is not commerce and
therefore is reserved to the states under the tenth amendment. "The
fact that an article is manufactured for export to another state does
not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce . . . ." In-
stead, "[c]ommerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part
of it."38 Thus, this case serves as a source for artificial devices
employed by the Court to limit the commerce power and ultimately
resulted in the dual sovereignty paradox.
Artificial devices utilized by the Court during the era of dual
sovereignty did not establish principled limits on the commerce
power. Instead, they created a vaguely defined area of state regula-
32. Id. at 195.
33. Id. at 196.
34. Id. at 197.
35. See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
36. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id. at 12.
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tory immunity under the tenth amendment. Such devices result-
ed in the invalidation of federal legislation of child labor in the
manufacturing process,"9 child labor taxes in the manufacturing
process,4 and wage and hour employment limitations.' Proba-
bly the most significant case to enforce state sovereignty was Cart-
er v. Carter Coal Co.,"' where the Court struck down the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935. The Court stated that
an attempt to regulate minimum wages and hours of employees
involved in mining and production "is a purely local activity"'
and beyond the reach of the commerce power.
Despite the potential significance of Carter Coal, the decision
unexpectedly signaled the end of the era of dual sovereignty.44
In a series of cases beginning in 1937, the Court reversed its po-
sition that the tenth amendment was an independent limitation on
the commerce clause and began a policy of almost complete defer-
ence to Congress." Until NLC revived dual sovereignty as it ap-
plied to state governmental entities, the effect of modem commerce
clause analysis was to disregard both the recognition of artificial
limitations on the commerce power and the dual sovereignty
paradox.
39. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
40. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
41. See Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton
R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
42. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
43. Id. at 304. A pivotal discussion rationalizing the notion of dual sovereignty was then made by Justice
Sutherland:
In addition to what has just been said, the conclusive answer is that the evils are all local evils over
which the federal government has no legislative control. Relation of employer and employee is a local
relation. At common law, it is one of the domestic relations, The wages are paid for the doing of local
work. Working conditions are obviously local conditions. The employees are engaged in or about com-
merce, but exclusively in producing a commodity. And the controversies and evils, which it is the ob-
ject of the act to regulate and minimize, are local controversies and evils affecting local work undertaken
to accomplish that local result. Such effect as they may have upon commerce, however extensive it
may be, is secondary and indirect. An increase in the greatness of the effect adds to its importance.
It does not alter its character.
Id. at 308-09.
44. Ironically, the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act was the only congressional commerce power legisla-
tion to be invalidated until the Court revived the doctrine of dual federalism in the 1976 NLC decision.
45. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 30 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, rejecting the production vs. commerce distinction, and allowing the regulation of in-
trastate activities that have a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce.); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
In Darby, the Court recognized that the tenth amendment is not an independent limitation on the commerce
power:
Our conclusion is unaffected by the tenth amendment .... The amendment states but a truism that
all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest
that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it
had been established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to
allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the
states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.
Id. at 123-24
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INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY
The doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity' paralleled the
doctrine of dual sovereignty; it was an artificial limitation placed
on the national taxing and spending power' of Congress. Interest-
ingly, the demise of this doctrine of dual sovereignty occurred
at about the same time. Although a complete review of the doc-
trine is beyond the scope of this Note, a fundamental knowledge
of tax immunity is necessary for an understanding of the analogy
employed by the Court in NLC to review regulatory immunity. "'
Although the origin of the doctrine traces back to Justice Mar-
shall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland,"9 the rule that states'
enjoy some measure of constitutional immunity from federal tax-
ation was first announced in Collector v. Day. 5o There the Court
held that the federal government could not tax the income for a
state judge. It is not surprising that the same justifications used
to protect dual sovereignty were used to protect tax immunity. 1
Not unexpectedly, the Court held "the means and instrumentali-
ties employed by ... [state] government to carry into opera-
tion ... [their reserved powers to be] exempt from Federal
taxations."5
Just as the early 1930's were the heyday of dual sovereignty,
the same period reflected the expansions of tax immunity."
However, the Court soon sought to limit the immunity to tradi-
tional/governmental, as distinguished from nontradition-
al/proprietary functions of state governments.' A major departure
from the tax immunity doctrine occurred in Helvering v.
Gerhardt,"5 where the income of employees of Port of New York
Authority, a bi-state corporation created by compact, was sub-
46. In Metcalf& Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926), the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity
was described as follows:
The very nature of our constitutional system of dual sovereign governments is such as impliedly to
prohibit the federal government from taxing the instrumentalities of a state government, and in a similar
manner to limit the power of the states to tax the instrumentalities of the federal government.
Id. at 521; see also Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 575 (1931).
47. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 cl. 1.
48. 426 U.S. 833, 843 at n.14.
49. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
50. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
51. For example, the Court stated that the states "are separate and distinct sovereignties," id. at 124, [tjheir
"unimpaired existence ... is essential," id. at 127 and they "should not be liable to be crippled, much less
defeated by the taxing power of aneter government, which power acknowledges no limita but the wiM of the
legislative body imposing the tax," id. at 125-26.
52. Id. at 127.
53. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932); Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U.S. 480 (1932);
Alward v. Johnson, 282 U.S. 509 (1931); Educational Films Corp. of Am. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1931).
54. See, e.g., Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934) (sustaining federal taxation of state-run transit oper-
ations); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U S. 437 (1905) (sustaining federal taxation of state-run liquor
operations).
55. 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
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ject to federal taxation. The justification for limiting tax immuni-
ty was that "any allowance of a tax immunity for the protection
of state sovereignty is at the expense of the sovereign power of
the nation to tax. Enlargement of the one involves the diminution
of the other." 6
In Graves v. New York ex re O'Keefe,"' Collector v. DayP was
expressly overruled "so far as [it] recognize[d] an implied con-
stitutional immunity from income taxation of the salaries of officers
or employees of ... a state government or [its] instrumentali-
ties."" Reaffirming Gerhardt, the Court stated "that the implied
immunity of one government and its agencies from taxation by
the other should, as a principle of constitutional construction, be
narrowly limited." °
The uncertainty resulting from attempts to determine "essen-
tial" governmental functions led to the abandonment of the dis-
tinction between governmental and proprietary functions in New
York v. United States. 6 ' Finally, in a recent plurality tax immuni-
ty decision, 2. the Court was split over what remained of the tax
immunity doctrine but did state that "an economic burden on tradi-
tional state functions without more is not a sufficient basis for
sustaining a claim of immunity."63 The teachings of the tax im-
munity decisions are important because the Court recognized the
difficulty of imposing artificial limits, which were not present in
the Constitution itself, on an enumerated congressional power.
Nevertheless, the Court revived the doctrine of dual sovereignty
in NLC by drawing an analogy to the tax immunity doctrine.6 '
THE REVIVAL OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY
The year 1976 signaled the revival of a form of dual sovereignty
when the Supreme Court invalidated the FLSA as it applied to
employees of state and local governments.6 However, NLC did
not revive the doctrine in its earlier form. Instead of disturbing
the modem analysis for determining the reach of the commerce
56. Id. at 416.
57. 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
58. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
59. Graves, 306 U.S. at 486.
60. Id. at 483.
61. 326 U.S. 572 (1946). Justice Frankfurter concluded that the distinction was "untenable." Id. at 583.
62. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
63. Id. at 461.
64. See supra note 48.
65. NLC v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985). In 1974, Congress amended the FLSA to include public agencies in the definition of
"employer" and therefore removed the exemption from the FLSA previously afforded the States. 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(d) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
[VOL. 6:89
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power, the Court overruled Maryland v. Wirtz"" and revived dual
sovereignty in the limited situations where federal regulation at-
tempted to regulate state and local governmental entities.67
Although the Court acknowledged that wages and hours of state
employees did affect interstate commerce, the Court recognized
the tenth amendment as an independent limitation on the com-
merce power of Congress. Two essential distinctions were made:
first, between private activities as opposed to state activities68 and
second, between traditional and nontraditional governmental func-
tions." Because the amendments to the Act sought directly to regu-
late the activities of states as public employers, they were invalid.
Thus, NLC held that when federal regulations "operate to direct-
ly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within
the authority granted Congress."7
An important consideration of dual sovereignty, as revived by
NLC, was that federal regulation of the wages and hours of state
employees was an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty."' By
looking to the financial impact of the Act the Court determined
that essential activities of state entities were affected in two ways.
First, the Act displaced the manner in which the states structure
delivery of governmental services. Second, it restricted the abili-
ty of the states to establish varying conditions of employment for
state employees.72
Instead of serving as the catalyst for further dual sovereignty
expansion, NLC has remained the only case since Carter v. Cart-
er Coal Co. ' to invalidate commerce power legislation because
of dual sovereignty. Cases subsequent to NLC reflect a trend
toward limiting dual sovereignty rather than further expanding
66. 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding federal minimum wage requirements to employees of state and local
government institutions such as hospitals and schools).
67. NLC, 426 U.S. 833.
68. The Court noted that even if preempting contrary state determinations, congressional power over pri-
vate endeavors would be upheld if the means selected were reasonably related to the ends desired. NLC, 426
U.S. at 840. But, "when Congress seeks to regulate directly the activities of States as public employers, it
transgresses an affirmative limitation on the exercise of its power akin to their commerce power affirmative
limitations contained in the Constitution." Id. at 841.
69. Although the attempt to distinguish between traditional and nontraditional governmental functions is
ultimately rejected in Garcia, the Court did state that fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health
and parks and recreation were functions typically performed by state and local governments. NLC, 426 U.S.
at 851.
70. Id. at 852.
71. Id. at 845.
72. Id. at 847-48.
73. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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the doctrine. This movement is especially apparent in the area
of the Civil War Amendments.7 '
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Control Reclamations
Association, Inc. ,' the Court clarified and further limited NLC
by adopting a three-part test to determine when commerce pow-
er legislation would violate dual sovereignty:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the "States as States." (426 U.S. 833,
854 (1976)). Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably "attribute[sl of state
sovereignty." (ad. at 845). And third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law
would directly impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions."(Id. at 852)."
Upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,
which required coal operators to return excavation sites to the
approximate original contours, the Court held that the tenth amend-
ment does not limit congress from displacing state police power
regulating private acitvities. Thus, the Act failed to regulate the
"States as States." Although the Act did require the states to operate
within federal guidelines, it only set forth minimum guidelines.
The states were free to establish their own regulatory programs
in order to enforce their needs. "
In two 1982 cases, the Court failed to clarify the dual sovereignty
issue created by NLC. First was United Transportation Union v.
Long Island Railroad. 78 There the Court upheld the Railway Labor
Act 9 as it applied to a state-owned railroad engaged in interstate
commerce. A tenth amendment challenge to the Act failed for
two reasons: railroad operations are not traditional state functions,
and states cannot acquire functions in order to erode federal
authority in areas of state regulation. "
Next the Court decided Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC) V. Mississippi." In FERC, the Court rejected a tenth
74. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding Congress can infringe on state autonomy
even in areas of traditional governmental functions when operating pursuant to the enabling clauses of the Civil
War Amendments); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) in which the Court stated that "the
decision in National League of Cities was based solely on an assessment of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause. .. " id. at 178, and that "principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle
to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amend-
ments ... [because] [tihose Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and
an intrusion on state sovereignty," id. at 179; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (plurality). In Fulli-
love, Justice Burger stated that the Court could look to Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to avoid "limita-
tions on the reach of the Commerce Power to regulate the actions of state and local governments." Id. at 476.
75. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
76. Id. at 287-88. Justice Marshall suggested in a footnote that a fourth prong be adopted that would entail
balancing the federal and state interests. Id. at 288 n.29.
77. Hodel, 452 U.S. 264.
78. 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
79. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
80. Long Island Railroad, 455 U.S. at 683-90.
81. 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (upholding Titles I and M and Section 210 of Title U of the Public Utility Regula-
tory Policies Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3201-3211; 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a-3, § 2601-2645).
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amendment challenge against legislation that required the states
to consider adopting and implementing a specific rate design and
other energy conservation measures. " The legislation further ex-
empted qualified power facilities from state and federal regula-
tions. The Court upheld the legislation using a pure balancing
approach rather than the Hodel three-part test." Although the legis-
lation was an infringement on state sovereignty, the Court held
that the generation and supply of electrical energy is an essential
element of interstate commerce." Because of the substantial in-
terstate effect, Congress could have totally preempted state legis-
lation. The Court instead held there was a use of state regulatory
machinery to advance federal goals. Thus, the legislation did not
control the exercise of Mississippi's sovereign powers."
The final case to attempt to resolve the dual sovereignty dilem-
ma was Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) v.
Wyoming. " In EEOC, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1976" was upheld in its application to state and local govern-
ments. EEOC illustrates that the Court was obviously troubled
by its treatment of the dual sovereignty issue. Having only the
year before decided FERC without relying on the Hodel three-
part test, the Court unexpectedly returned to it in this case.""
One author has concluded that of the post-NLC cases, EEOC
was the case closest in fact to NLC and, therefore, the most ap-
propriate case to resolve the dual sovereignty issue." This is be-
cause "management of state parks is clearly a traditional state
function,""' and also because interference with the employment
relationship between a state and its employees "displaces state
policies" 1 concerning the delivery of governmental services.
Despite the theoretical similarity to that in NLC, Wyoming's tenth
amendment challenge was rejected with no better analysis on dual
sovereignty than in the earlier cases. Applying the three-part test,
82. The Court distinguished FERC from Hodel because here the states were only required to consider the
federal guidelines as opposed to the requirement that the federal guidelines be adopted in Hodel. NLC was
also distinguished because there the issue was "the extent to which state sovereignty shields the States from
generally applicable federal regulations." Id. at 758-59.
83. FERC, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); see also note 76 and accompanying text.
84. FERC, 456 U.S. at 757.
85. Id. at 765.
86. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
87. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. The Act makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any employee
on the basis of age. In EEOC, Wyoming enforced mandatory retirement upon a fifty-five year old game warden
pursuant to a state statute that required retirement if the employer did not approve of continued employment.
460 U.S. at 234-35.
88. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 239.
89. Alfange, Congressional Regulation of the "States Qua States ": From National League of Cities to EEOC
v. Wyoming, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 215, 259.
90. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 239 (citing NLC, 426 U.S. at 851). Thus, the Court avoided the problem it faced
in Long Island Railroad where it held that the management of railroads is not a traditional state function. Id.
91. NLC v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 847 (1976).
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Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, found that the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act did regulate the states as states
because it denied the state the right to enforce mandatory retire-
ment at age fifty-five. Brennan did not think it was necessary to
resolve the second prong under his analysis.92 However, the Act
did not directly impair the State's ability to structure integral oper-
ations in areas of traditional governmental functions.9" In a separate
concurrence, Justice Stevens suggested that the Court's dual
sovereignty analysis was inconsistent with the Constitution and
that NLC should be overruled.9
The post-NLC cases teach that regulatory immunity is no differ-
ent from tax immunity when it comes to the imposition of artifi-
cial judicial limitations on an enumerated constitutional power.
Unable to establish a principled basis for the dual sovereignty doc-
trine, the Court abandoned its balancing test and its attempts at
distinguishing one case from another. When raised again in Gar-
cia, the issue needed resolution in order to protect against the
"threat... that... National League of Cities.. .will be re-
vived and . .. Congress's power over commerce subjected to limi-
tations that are derived not from any constitutional principles of
general applicability, but solely from the Justices' conception of
desirable public policy.""
GARCIA V. SAN ANTONIO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY
In the instant case, the Court is confronted with the same pro-
visions of the FLSA with which it was concerned in NLC. Justice
Blackmun begins the majority opinion with a frank recognition
that NLC failed to identify the means by which a traditional govern-
mental function could be distinguished from a nontraditional func-
tion of government." Concluding that the traditional governmental
functions test is inconsistent with established principles of feder-
alism, the Court expressly overrules NLC.9 '
Numerous factors contribute to the rejection of the NLC ap-
proach to state regulatory immunity. A primary factor is the ina-
bility of the Court subsequent to NLC to define the scope of the
92. EEOC, 460 U.S. at 238. However in a footnote, Justice Brennan did state that "[plrecisely what is
meant by an 'undoubted attribute of state sovereignty' is somewhat unclear, however, and our subsequent cases
applying the National League of Cities test have had little occasion to amplify our understanding of the con-
cept." Id. at 238 n.Il.
93. Id. at 239.
94. Id. at 249-50.
95. Alfange, supra note 89, at 281.
96. 469 U.S. 528, 530 (1985).
97. Id. at 547.
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functions protected.98 Also, the same criticisms directed to the
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity are applicable to state
regulatory immunity." Moreover, alternative standards based upon
either historical or non-historical standards are unworkable be-
cause of the ever-changing nature of society and of the services
that government becomes obligated to provide.
However, rather than continuing to recognize a still undefined
area of regulation reserved to the states, the Court holds that the
national political processes best protect state sovereignty. Instead
of artificial restrictions on enumerated powers, the "composition
of the Federal Government . . .protect[s] the States from over-
reaching by Congress."10 0
Dissenting in Garcia, Justice Powell concludes that the majori-
ty's approach would alter the federal system.' 1 Several factors
contribute to this conclusion. First, Powell suggests that NLC did
not require that traditional governmental functions be defined; in-
stead state regulatory immunity can be protected by balancing the
competing federal and state interests.0 2 Having concluded that
NLC should not have been overruled, Powell later suggests that
the abandonment of dual sovereignty will seriously disturb the
balance of power between the states and the federal government.0"
Justice O'Connor also dissents. To her the" 'essence' of feder-
alism is that the States as States have legitimate interests which
the National Government is bound to respect even though its laws
are supreme."" Therefore, state autonomy is an essential element
of federalism; federalism is irrelevant if state autonomy is ig-
nored.'
98. To illustrate the inability to distinguish between traditional governmental functions and nonimmune func-
tions, compare Molina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth. 680 F.2d 841, 845-46 (1st. Cir. 1982) (operat-
ing a highway authority); Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (6th Cir. 1979) (operating
a municipal airport); United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-3 (9th Cir. 1978) (licensing automobile drivers);
Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967-69 (W.D. Mo. 1982), affd on other
grounds, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983) (regulating ambulance services), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985);
Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 742 F.2d 949, 960-64 (6th Cir. 1984) (performing solid waste disposal)
(all protected functions under NLC); with Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465,
1472 (9th Cir. 1983) (provision of in-house domestic services for the aged and handicapped); Hughes Air Corp.
v. Public Util. Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1981) (regulations of air transportation); Friends
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d. Cir. 1977) (regulation of traffic on public roads), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 902 (1977); Woods v. Homes and Structures of Pittsburgh, Kansas, Inc., 489 F.Supp. 1270, 1296-97
(Kan. 1980) (issuance of industrial development bonds) (all not entitled to immunity under NLC).
99. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 543.
100. Id. at 550-51.
101. Id. at 557.
102. Id. at 561-62.
103. Id. at 572.
104. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 581 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
105. 469 U.S. at 588. In response to Justice Blackmun's statement that the selection and composition of the
federal government protects states from overreaching by Congress, Justice O'Conner states that "[w]ith the
abandonment of National League of Cities, all that stands between the remaining essentials of state sovereignty
and Congress is the latter's underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint." Id.
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ANALYSIS
Garcia is part of an effort by the Court to determine the proper
function of judicial review. In the minds of many, the opinion
will appear to be an extreme departure from Marshall's classic
statement in Marbury v. Madison.." that "it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.""° Dissenting in Garcia, Justice Powell suggests that the Court
"offers no explanation for ignoring the teaching of the most fa-
mous case in our history. " "°e Nevertheless, the argument that the
national political processes can best protect state sovereignty is
nearly as old as Marbury v. Madison itself. Consider Justice Mar-
shall's words from Gibbons v. Ogden,"°' decided just twenty-one
years after Marbury:
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their
constituents possess at elections are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring
war, the sole restraints on which ...the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments. -
Justice Powell is incorrect when he suggests that the Court has
ignored the teaching of Marbury v. Madison. Indeed, Justice Mar-
shall recognized that where the subject matter of a controversy
is political in nature or otherwise within the authority of the ex-
ecutive, no judicial remedy will exist."' To the contrary, a judi-
cial remedy will exist and the court will exercise judicial review
where individual rights are involved."' Therefore, Garcia is en-
tirely consistent with the application of judicial review announced
in Marbury.
Central to the majority opinion in Garcia is that an "unelected
federal judiciary"" 3 is not the ideal branch of government to best
protect state sovereignty. That the Supreme Court is not charged
with the duty of replacing the views of Congress with its own
is ably summarized by Professor Wechsler-"the Court is on
weakest ground when it opposes its interpretation of the Consti-
tution to that of Congress in the interest of the States, whose
representatives control the legislative process and, by hypothe-
106. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
107. Id. at 177.
108. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 567 (Powell, J. dissenting).
109. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
110. Id. at 197; see also Wickard v. Filbum 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) ("effective restraints on [the com-
merce clause power's] exercise must proceed from political rather than judicial processes."). Id. at 120; Hel-
vering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 416 (1938) ("resort to the usual processes of political action ... provides
a readier and more adaptable means than any which courts can afford, for securing accommodations of the
competing demands" of the national and state governments.). Id. at 416.
111. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.
112. Id.
113. 469 U.S. at 54 6.
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sis, have broadly acquiesced in sanctioning the challenged Act
of Congress."""
There is no reason to suggest that Congress is hostile to the
interests of the states. After all, Congress is composed of represen-
tatives elected from the states; Congress reflects a distinct local
spirit. This local spirit led James Madison to conclude that "[t]he
State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential
parts of the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise essen-
tial to the operation or organization of the former,""' and that
"[a] local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members
of Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures
of the particular States.""6
Notwithstanding a distinct local spirit, Justice Powell suggests
that "[m]embers of Congress are elected from the various States,
but once in office they are Members of the Federal Government."" 7
The response is that those elected officials who enact legislation
that impermissibly intrudes on the states forget that they were elect-
ed to represent their constituents. The approval of those consti-
tuents will be reflected when the electors exercise popular control
at the ballot box.
However, when legislation is finally enacted it can be said that
the congressional decision represents the decision of the states
themselves. For "on any direct show of strength in passing legis-
lation, a Senate majority based on the states must be supported
by a House majority based on population and must also avoid a
veto by the President."" 8 Thus, if it is recognized that Congress
is not hostile to the States, "the national political process in the
United States . . is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or res-
114. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selec-
tion of the National Government, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 543, 559 (1954); see also NLC, 426 U.S. at 876 (Bren-
nan J., dissenting) ("It is unacceptable that the judicial process should be thought superior to the political process
in this area. Under the Constitution the Judiciary has no role to play beyond finding that Congress has not
made an unreasonable legislative judgment respecting what is 'commerce.' "). That the Court can act as a super-
legislature by imposing its views over those of Congress has been rejected since the end of the era of substan-
tive due process. Instead, the Court will defer to Congress where legislation is enacted pursuant to an enumer-
ated power. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934).
115. Wechsler, supra note 114, at 546 (quoting The Federalist No. 45 at 311 (J. Madison) (Lodge ed. 1888)).
116. Id. at 547.
117. 469 U.S. at 564-65 (Powell, J., dissenting).
118. Wechsler, supra note 114, at 548.
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training new intrusions by the center on the domain of the
States."11 9
While Professor Wechsler's argument is well-reasoned and con-
vincing, it does not attempt to explain the meaning of the tenth
amendment. As previously stated, no provision of the Constitu-
tion can be interpreted as meaningless.20 However, a constitu-
tional provision may have meaning, yet not be enforced by the
courts."' The majority in Garcia recognized that "[t]he States un-
questionably do 'retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authori-
ty' (citation omitted). They do so, however, only to the extent
that the Constitution has not divested them of their original pow-
ers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government.""'
Justice O'Connor supports a narrow commerce clause when state
regulatory immunity is involved. Dissenting in Garcia, she returns
to the ends/means test announced in McCulloch v. Maryland".
and concludes that valid legislation must also comply with "the
letter and spirit of the constitution.""' She states that "[t]he spirit
of the Tenth Amendment . . . is that the States will retain their
integrity in a system in which the laws of the United States are
nevertheless supreme.
Despite Justice O'Connor's persuasive argument, the Court has
never been able to articulate a neutral and general principle"6 for
holding that the tenth amendment is an independent limitation on
an enumerated constitutional power. Thus, the conclusion must
be that the tenth amendment is only a truism".. and declaratory
of federalism- that powers which have not been delegated to the
federal government are reserved to states or the people.
ALTERNATIVES WITHIN THE HOLDING
While the majority in Garcia seemingly adopts Professor
119. Wechsler, supra note 114, at 558. As one author has stated:
[T]he ultimate issue is not whether the national political process protects federalism interests perfectly.
Indeed, in the nature of things mistakes inevitably will be made. The real question is whether judicial
intervention is likely to rectify those mistakes without multiplying them. If state interests could be iden-
tified objectively, we might be able to say with confidence that Congress had ignored a real state in-
terest, and that therefore a judicial role would not entail great risks. But... it seems that the risk of
judicial error is quite high in light of difficulties in devising appropriate doctrine limiting Congress' power.
Tushnet, Constitutional and Statutory Analyses in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1301,
1334 (1978).
120. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
121. The guaranty clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), Chief
Justice Taney determined that the guaranty clause involved a nonjusticiable political question and precluded
judicial review of the dispute.
122. 469 U.S. at 549.
123. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
124. 469 U.S. at 585 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
126. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. Rav. 1 (1959).
127. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
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Wechsler's conclusion that the national political processes best
protect state sovereignty, two additional authorities are cited in
a footnote supporting the rationale. "8 Both authorities suggest al-
ternatives that extend beyond the proposition that the Court should
defer to Congress when confronted with federalism issues.
Professor Choper, in his Judicial Review and the National Po-
litical Process, recognizes the antimajoritarian nature of judicial
review." 9 Concluding that an unelected judiciary should not sup-
plant the will of the majority in the federalism area, Choper iden-
tifies his "Federalism Proposal":
The federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions respecting the ultimate power of the na-
tional government vis-a-vis the states; rather, the constiutional issue of whether federal action is beyond
the authority of the central government and thus violates 'states rights' should be treated as nonjusticiable,
final resolution being relegated to the political branches-i.e., Congress and the President.'"
Choper rationalizes the proposal by recognizing the Court as
one of limited institutional capital."' To Choper the primary func-
tion of the Court is to protect individual liberties;3 "' the states are
protected by the national political process itself. Thus, when the
Court decides a federalism issue it unnecessarily expends limited
institutional capital and subjects itself to something similar to a
loss of judicial integrity.
Choper suprisingly suggested that NLC was not necessarily
wrong. "There is no necessary disagreement here with the Court's
view in Usery that certain federal regulations of 'the States qua
States,' which are otherwise fully within Congress's delegated pow-
ers . . . may transgress the constitutional principle of federal-
ism . .. ,133 Despite seemingly accepting the notion of dual
sovereignty, Choper reconciles the paradox by concluding that
judicial review is not the proper tool for preventing the destruc-
tion of state sovereignty.' Instead, the Court must defer to the
national political process.
While the Court does not address the Federalism Proposal, it
is likely that such a bright line test of nonjusticiability would be
too rigid in its application. Indeed, Choper himself states that the
128. 469 U.S. at 551 n. Il (citing 1. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
175-84 (1980)); La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and
the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH U.L.Q. 779 (1982).
129. 1. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 6 (1980).
130. 3. C-AoPEa, supra ote 129, at 175.
131. Id. at 169. Choper quotes Alexander Bickel when he states that "[t]here is a natural quantitative limit
to the number of major, principled interventions the Court can permit itself ... A Court unmindful of this
limit will find that more and more of its pronouncements are unfulfilled promises, which will ultimately dis-
credit and denude the function of constitutional adjudication." Id. at 169; see also A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 94-95 (1978).
132. J. CHOPER, supra note 129 at 60-128.
133. Id. at 220-21.
134. Id. at 221.
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proposal takes a "racial tone." Choper further suggests that the
advantage of such a proposal is the avoidance of cases such as
NLC challenging the exercise of national authority." However,
it would also be a disadvantage in that the Court would be un-
available as a source of authority for approving challenged legis-
lation." 6 Although deference to Congress in federalism cases is
an important statement of judicial review, the Court in Garcia
did not choose to adopt Choper's extreme restructuring of the
doctrine.
In response to Professor Wechsler's challenge that judicial
review be supported by neutral and general principles, Professor
La Pierre offers political accountability as a justification for and
a limitation on Congress' power over the states."' To La Pierre,
political checks on the accountability of Congress represent the
will of a national majority. "These political checks are simply the
impact of national policy on private activity and the imposition
on the national electorate of the administrative and financial costs
of enforcing national policies. " '
Thus, La Pierre suggest that the states can be used as agents
of the national government to implement national policy. The en-
forcement of national law will often require the affirmative exer-
cise of state authority over private activities. To the extent the
legislation impacts state sovereignty, if Congress is politically ac-
countable, the intrusion will be permissible because it reflects the
135. Nowak, Book Review, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 1223, 1231 (1980) (reviewing J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980)). Using the Federalism Proposal, Professor Choper suggests
that the Supreme Court should not have adjudicated the federalism issue in the following illustrative cases:
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922), whether Congress had power to impose a tax
on enterprises employing child labor (taxing power); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), whether
Congress had power to pay money to farmers in exchange for their agreement to reduce planted acreage
(spending power); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), whether Congress had power to pro-
hibit the interstate transportation of goods produced in factories employing child labor (commerce pow-
er); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948), whether Congress had power to regulate
rents after the end of hostilities in World War 1 (war power); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299
(1941), whether Congress had power to penalize interference with voting in state primary elections
for congressmen (power respecting manner of electing congressmen); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920), whether the President and Senate had power to enter into a treaty to protect migratory birds
(treaty power); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), whether Congress had power to condition a state's
entry into the Union on the state's continuing the location of its capital (power over admission of new
states); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), whether Congress had power to forbid
racial discrimination in housing (power to enforce thirteenth amendment); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883), whether Congress had power to forbid racial discrimination in public accommodations (pow-
er to enforce fourteenth amendment equal protection); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960),
whether Congress had power to forbid racial discrimination in voting (power to enforce fifteenth amend-
ment); Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), whether Congress had power to
impose a national income tax (prohibition of laying of direct taxes except in proportion to the census).
J. CHOPER, supra note 129, at 193-94; see also Nowak, Book Review, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 1223, 1231 (1980).
136. Nowak, Book Review, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 1223, 1231 (1980).
137. La Pierre, supra note 128, at 788.
138. Id. at 1052.
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will of the majoritarian political process."3 ' Despite an extensive-
ly developed argument, the Court in Garcia did not extend its
analysis beyond the proposition that the national political process
best protects state sovereignty. Instead, the Court falls back upon
New York v. United States' ° and holds that it is not necessary
to "go beyond what is required for a reasoned disposition of the
kind of controversy now before the Court. " "
RAMIFICATIONS
In Garcia the Court has not abandoned its duty to exercise ju-
dicial review. Indeed, the holding is very narrow. The Court will
defer to Congress in those cases that involve a pure federalism
issue only. It is realistic to assume that if a federalism issue arises
that also involves either an infringement of a liberty interest or
adversely affects individuals not protected by the political process,
the Court will continue to review such legislation with strict scru-
tiny rather than give total deference to Congress."
Furthermore, the Court has already indicated that it will not
defer to Congress in areas such as the legislative veto where the
structural framework of the Constitution is violated."' The sig-
nificance of Garcia is that Congress can best protect federalism,
but only when it performs as constitutionally authorized. Article
one vests legislative power in the Congress, consisting of both
the House and the Senate. The legislative process is short cir-
cuited when only one body can exercise veto power.'44 There-
fore, the Garcia rationale does not extend into areas where the
bicameral legislative process is violated.
The current state of the law concerning the dormant commerce
power should be unaffected by Garcia. The Court exercises ju-
dicial review to interpret the meaning of congressional silence
and the extent to which the states can regulate commerce in the
absence of such congressional direction. A legitimate state
sovereignty issue is clearly present in this situation. Although it
may appear that the national political process is inoperative when
Congress has not acted, silence by Congress implies an intent not
to regulate the activity. Nevertheless, the Court has nothing to
defer to. Although state sovereignty is affected, Garcia will not
disturb the present balancing test the Court employs to determine
139. Id. at 1053.
140. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
141. Id. at 583.
142. See, 'e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
143. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
144. Id. at 954-55 (discussing the bicameral legislative process and the legislative veto).
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whether state regulation unreasonably interferes with national in-
terests. "'
For the Court to defer to Congress on pure federalism issues
does not create a constitutional problem, nor is it an entirely novel
approach. Already the Court defers in the area of economic equal
protection"4 and the enforcement of the Civil War Amendments,"'
to name a few. Additionally, the decision to defer to Congress
is a primary reason for the demise of substantive due process."4 8
In any event, it is apparent that the Garcia rationale can be ex-
tended into the intergovernmental tax immunity area as well as
the taxing and spending area. To the extent NLC revives the
governmental/proprietory test in tax immunity, Garcia clearly in-
dicates that such an approach is "unworkable.""4 9 The conclusion
then is that congressional determinations of which functions of
state government will be subject to taxation will not be subject
to judicial review.
Similarly, Garcia is significant because of its potential effect
on the function of judicial review. When the Court acts as a super-
legislature, as is the case when the validity of congressional enact-
ments are considered, the effect of judicial review is to "nullify
the finished product of the lawmaking process."' 0 As indicated
previously, a great deal of political time and effort is expended
before a law is ultimately enacted.'' To this extent judicial review
is antimajoritarian and incompatible with conventional American
democratic theory. "2
Deference to the national political processes is a principled al-
ternative to the paradox created by dual sovereignty. Choper quite
correctly concludes that the mechanisms currently in existence
for reversing unfavorable exercises of judicial review are both
rarely used and ineffective.' The primary tool for correcting ju-
dicial review, the constitutional amendment process, has been used
on only four occasions in our history."' However, the procedures
145. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 170 (1970); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State
Power, 27 VA. L. Rv. 1 (1940).
146. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949).
147. See supra note 74 and accompanying text; see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Supreme
Court defers to Congress on voting rights statute enacted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment).
148. See supra note 114.
149. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 543.
150. J. CHOPER, supra note 129, at 25.
151. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
152. J. CIIOPER, supra note 129, at 27.
153. Id. at 49.
154. The eleventh amendment in 1795, overruling Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793); the first section
of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, overruling Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); the sixteenth
amendment in 1913 overruling Pollack v. Farmers, Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 1895); the twenty-sixth
amendment in 1971 overruling Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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required for amending the Constitution clearly reflect the an-
timajoritarian nature of this alternative. The difficulty of the
process is certainly the reason it has been so rarely employed.
A second device, congressional control over the budget and terms
of the Supreme Court, is less direct and even more uncommon
than the use of constitutional amendments. For this reason Choper
concludes that this alternative is of only "minor significance .,""'
Another mechanism, political control over the composition of
the Court, is distinguished from the political composition of the
national government envisioned by Professor Wechsler to pro-
tect state sovereignty. Nine appointed justices are in no way similar
to representatives selected by the electorate.' 56 Although a proce-
dure for impeachment is in place, a justice cannot be impeached
because of popular disapproval of his opinions. To the extent im-
peachment requires a two-thirds vote, it is clearly antimajoritari-
an. Also, it is improbable that unpopular constitutional inter-
pretations on state sovereignty will be corrected by the appoint-
ment process. This is because the judicial appointment is subject
to Senate approval. Realistically, many presidential terms will be
needed in order to alter the political philosophy of a majority of
the Court.'57
Choper effectively rebuts the objections to judicial deference
to the national political process when state sovereignty is involved.
A central objection to the approach is that separation of powers
is violated when either of the political branches can serve as judges
of the scope of their own power."' However, this approach is
not unprecedented. Justice Marshall stated that the judiciary could
act as the final arbiter of its own authority in Marbury v. Madi-
son. "9 A second objection is that unbridled congressional authority
in the absence of judicial review could destroy state sovereignty.
The problem with this objection is that it only serves to fuel the
paradox. There are no reasons to suggest that Congress is hostile
to the states6 0 or that state interests are not protected within the
workings of the political system.
If there are legislators who believe that state sovereignty is best
protected by judicial review, then the national dominion is poten-
tially aggravated. 6' This is because of the heavy presumption of
constitutionality given to congressional law. If congressmen enact
155. J. CHOPER, supra note 129, at 49.
156. Wechsler, supra note 114.
157. J. CHOPER, supra note 129, at 50.
158. Id. at 211.
159. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
160. See supra notes 115, 116 and accompanying text.
161. J.CHOPER, supra note 129, at 226-27.
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legislation without considering the constitutionality of the act and
the Court subsequently defers to Congress, judicial review serves
no purpose. However, the knowledge that the Court will not ex-
ercise judicial review in the area of state sovereignty prevents con-
gressmen from shirking their congressional responsibility to
determine constitutionality on the front end of potential legislation.
Thus, the function of judicial review can be more effectively
served by deferring to Congress in the area of state sovereignty.
In the future the Court will be able to better utilize its "institu-
tional capital" and also be secure in the knowledge that the na-
tional political process is at work protecting state sovereignty.
CONCLUSION
The Garcia decision is significant in many respects. It suggests
that Congress' power over commerce is indeed plenary and total-
ly immune from artificial, judicial limitations created to protect
state sovereignty. While further extension of the Garcia ration-
ale remains to be seen, it is clear that little, if anything, is left
of the tenth amendment. And although Justice Black strongly sup-
ported "Our Federalism," 62 the "radical transformation that has
occurred in the structure of 'Our Federalism' in the nearly two
centuries of our existence has emptied the concept of nearly all
legal content and replaced it with a frank recognition of the legal
hegemony of the national government." 6" However, equally im-
portant to constitutional analysis is the determination that the dual
sovereignty paradox no longer exists as a potential impediment
to commerce power legislation.
Granville Tate, Jr.
162. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
163. Monaghan, Me Burger Court and 'Our Federalism," 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Summer 1980 at 39.
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